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Arnulf Grub/er 
Time for a Change: On the Patterns of 
Diffusion of Innovation 
A MEDIEVAL PRELUDE 
T HE SUBJ ECT OF THIS ESSA y is the temporal patterns of the diffusion of technological innovations and what these pat-terns may imply for the future of the human environ-
ment.' But first let us set the clock back nearly one thousand years: 
return for a moment to monastic life in eleventh-century Bur-
gundy. 
Movement for the reform of the Benedictine rule led St. Robert 
to found the abbey of Greaux (Cisrercium) in 1098. Gteaux 
would become the mother house of some 740 Cisrercian monas-
teries. About 80 percent of these were founded in the first one 
hundred years of the Cistercian movement; nearly half of the 
foundings occurred in the years between 1125 and 1155 (see Fig-
ttre 1 ). Many traced their roots to the Clairvaux abbey founded as 
an offshoot of Greaux in 1115 by the tireless St. Bernard, known 
as the Mellifluous Doctor. The nonlinear, S-shaped time path of 
the initial spread of Cistercian rule resembles the diffusion pat-
terns we will observe for technologies. The patterns of temporal 
diffusion do not vary across centuries, cultures, and artifacts: slow 
growth at the beginning, followed by accelerating and then decel-
Amulf Griibler is a Research Scholar in the Enuironmentally Compatible Energy Strate-
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Figure 1. The Initial Diffusion of Cistercian Monasteries in Europe . 
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1877). 
erating growth, culminating in saturation or a full niche. Some-
times a symmetrical decline follows or a new growth pulse. 
Over time the Cistercians also diffused in space. Their pattern of 
settlements shows significant differences in spatial density. The 
innovation origin, Burgundy, was home to the four major mother 
houses and hosted the highest spatial concentration of settlements. 
From there, daughter houses were founded ("regional subinnovation 
centers," in the terminology of spatial diffusion), from which 
Cistercians spread further into their respective hinterlands ("the 
neighborhood effect") and to other subregional centers, originat-
ing yet further settlements. The density of settlements decreased at 
the periphery, away from innovation centers, implying persistent 
regional diversity and disparities. The Cistercians also differenti-
ated into "subfamilies," named after their respective parental houses. 
In fact, each subfamily followed its own pattern of settlements, 
regional specialization, and implementation of the Cistercian rule. 
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Some of the additions to the Cistercian rule were not genuine 
new settlements but "takeovers." For example, the existing 
Benedictine monastery of Savigny, with all its daughter houses, 
submitted to the rule of the Clairvaux Cistercians in 114 7 and in 
turn became the mother house of all Cistercian settlements in the 
British Isles. 
Despite distance and differentiation, all the monasteries com-
municated closely. The industrious Cistercians thus introduced 
and channeled influential innovations, including new agricultural 
practices and the water mill, throughout Europe in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries. The British monks excelled in wool 
production. In fact, according to the Cistercian rule, settlements 
were to be located in remote, undeveloped areas. Thus, Cistercian 
monasteries became important local nodes for the colonization of 
land within Europe and, hence, for deforestation. 
The Cistercian topology reveals a hierarchy of centers of cre-
ation and structured lines of spread. The patterns bear witness to 
the existence of networks. As we shall see, social and spatial 
networks, and their interactions, support and shape the diffusion 
process.2 
INVENTION, IN NOVATIO N, THEN DIFFUSION 
In discussing the time for a change associated with a technology, 
it is necessary to consider invention and innovation as well as 
diffusion. Discourse now customarily distinguishes among these 
three concepts following the classic analyses made in the 1930s by 
the Austrian economist Joseph Schum peter. 3 Invention is the first 
demonstration of the principal feasibility of a proposed new arti-
fact or solution. Fermi's Chicago reactor demonstrated the feasi-
bility of a controlled nuclear fission reaction (invention). In 1958, 
sixteen years after the inauguration of Fermi's pile, the Shippingport, 
Pennsylvania, reactor went into operation to generate commercial 
electric power (innovation). Some forty years later more than one 
hundred nuclear reactors now generate some 20 percent of the 
electricity in the United States (diffusion). Analogously, we might 
say St. Robert invented the Cistercian rule, St. Bernard innovated, 
and diffusion followed. 
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In fact, considering the Cistercian rule as a technology makes an 
important point. In the narrowest definition, technology is repre-
sented by the objects people make, axes and arrowheads and their 
updated equivalents. Anthropologists call them "artifacts"; engi-
neers call them "hardware." But technology does not end here. 
Artifacts must be produced, that is, invented, designed, and manu-
factured. This process requires a larger system of hardware (ma-
chinery, a manufacturing plant), factor inputs (labor, energy, raw 
materials), and finally "software" (human knowledge and skills). 
The third of these elements, which French scholars call tech-
nique, represents the disembodied aspect of technology, its knowl-
edge base. Technique is required not only for the production of 
given artifacts but ultimately also for their use, both at the level of 
the individual and at the level of society. An individual must 
know, for example, how to drive a car; a society must know how 
to conduct an election. Organizational and institutional forms 
(including markets), social norms, and attitudes all shape how 
particular systems of production and use of artifacts emerge and 
function. They are the originating and selection mechanisms of 
particular artifacts (or combinations thereof) and set the rate at 
which they become incorporated into a given socioeconomic set-
ting. This process of filtering, tailoring, and acceptance is technol-
ogy diffusion. 
Before discussing diffusion further, let us return to the prior 
processes, invention and innovation. In truth, a realistic history of 
social and technological innovations would consist mostly of non-
starters. The overwhelming share of inventions are ignored. And 
an analysis of several hundred major innovations over the past 
two centuries shows a typical span of about fifteen to forty years 
between invention and innovation.4 Moreover, the existence of 
one or more possible innovations in itself hardly guarantees subse-
quent diffusion. 
To appreciate the uncertainty in the early phases of technology 
development, let us look at a historical problem of technological 
hazard and environmental pollution from steam railways. In the 
early days of railroad expansion in the United States, sparks in the 
smoke from wood-burning steam locomotives caused a consider-
able fire hazard to both human settlements and forests. 5 Inventors 
and entrepreneurs registered more than one thousand patents on 
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"smoke-spark arresters" during the nineteenth century in a futile 
search for a solution, which arrived finally not by an add-on 
technology but by the replacement of steam by diesel and electric 
locomotives. This large number of alternatives illustrates that di-
versity and experimentation are precursors to diffusion. Many are 
called, but few are chosen. 
Moreover, what is chosen for diffusion is not necessarily the 
best. The selection of a particular technological alternative may 
not conform to ex ante or ex post judgments about optimality. 
Sometimes selection of a particular alternative stems from an 
accumulation of small, even random events, eventually "locking 
in" a particular configuration. Thereafter, positive feedback mecha-
nisms yield increasing returns to adoption of the standardized 
alternative. We suspect that the standard gauge of railroads or the 
disk operating systems in use now in personal computers are not 
the "best" but simply prevailed at a certain time in history and 
therefore can only be dislodged with great difficulty.6 
What are the factors in setting the diffusion clock? One is 
simply opposition to change. Opposition to proposed and diffus-
ing technologies always recurs. The most cited case is the Luddites, 
who destroyed knitting and other textile machinery between 1811 
and 1816. A similar movement, led by Captain Swing, resisted the 
introduction of mechanical threshing in rural England in the 1830s. 
As shown in Figure 2, the opposition to the machines was itself an 
orderly diffusive process. The time it took for the craze to smash 
machines to spread-two weeks-shows that social interaction 
and communication were highly effective far in advance of mod-
ern transport and telephony. Although opposition causes uncer-
tainty about the eventual fate of an innovation, it fulfills two 
important evolutionary roles. First, it can operate as a selection 
mechanism for rejecting socially unsustainable solutions pr tech-
nologies. Second, it helps qualify technologies to respond to soci-
etal concerns, improving their performance and thus enabling fur-
ther, even pervasive, diffusion. 
In a classic 1936 article Earl Pemberton provided many illumi-
nating examples of curves of gradual cultural diffusion.7 The first 
country to introduce postage stamps was England in 1840. Such a 
good idea; yet it took close to fifty years for a sampling of thirty-
seven independent states in Europe, North America, and South 
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Figure 2. Resistance to Technology as a Diffusion Process: Number of 
Threshing Machines Attacked during the Captain Swing Movement in 
England in 1830. 
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America to imitate. A more delicate idea, touching on the nature 
and control of the family, is the first compulsory school atten-
dance law, enacted at the state level in the United States in 1847. 
It took fully eighty years, until 192 7, for the last state then belong-
ing to the United States to adopt similar legislation. These ex-
amples already emphasize that changes in technologies and social 
techniques are not one-time, discrete events but rather a process 
characterized by time lags and often lengthy periods of diffusion. 
They also suggest that when diffusion succeeds, the forces and 
factors determining its speed and extent may change over time.8 
Performance, cost, fashion, and familiarity are among the consid-
erations. Nevertheless, the diversity and complex interactions at 
the micro level appear often to lead to smooth, orderly behavior at 
On the Patterns of Diffusion of Innovation 25 
the macro level, whether of Cistercians and Luddites, or, as we 
shall see, canals and passenger cars. Some theorists argue that 
orderly macroeconomic evolution requires such microeconomic 
diversity, which at first glance might instead seem likely to dissi-
pate order. 9 
In addition to sociological and economic factors, straightfor-
ward, generic considerations appear to influence the speed of 
diffusion. The scope of technical change itself is a powerful one. 
We might distinguish four levels: 1) incremental improvements; 2) 
radical changes in individual technologies and artifacts; 3) changes 
in technology systems, that is, combinations of radical changes in 
technologies combined with organizational and managerial changes; 
and 4) changes in clusters and families of technologies and in 
associated organizational and institutional settings. 10 The latter 
levels of change, as well as larger system sizes, will likely entail 
longer times for diffusion. 11 
In sum, inventive and innovative activities provide the potentials 
for change. However, diffusion translates these potentials into 
changes in social practice. One abbey could not transform Euro-
pean agriculture; 740 did. Diffusive, largely imitative or repetitive 
phenomena are at the heart of the changes in society and its 
material structures, infrastructures, and artifacts. Thus, in the sub-
sequent discussion, the analysis of time required for diffusion 
provides the central metric to analyze processes of social and 
technological change. Let us now try to grasp the main patterns. 
THE DURATION OF DIFFUSION 
We will consider an increasingly complex series of cases of tech-
nology diffusion, characterized by the environment in which diffu-
sion processes operate. In the simplest case, an idea, practice, or 
artifact l'epresents so radical a departure from existing solutions 
that it largely creates its own market niche. In practice, preexisting 
means for meeting basic social functions, such as transport and 
communication, are always present; nothing is truly new or free of 
competitors. Physicist Elliott Montroll called evolution a sequence 
of replacements. 12 But clearly, some technologies enter much more 
accommodating environments than others. 
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The development of canals in the early nineteenth century offers 
a reasonable case of simple diffusion. In fact, the actual data on 
the growth of the canal network in the United States are approxi-
mated very well by a symmetrical growth curve, a three-parameter 
logistic equation in this case (Figure 3).13 The estimated upper 
limit of the diffusion process, some 4,000 miles of canals, matches 
the historical maximum of 4,053 miles of canal in operation in 
1851. The char<:cteristic duration of diffusion (or 6.t), defined as 
the time required for the process to unfold from 10 percent to 90 
percent of its extent, is thirty-one years. The canals spread through 
the United States at about the same rate as the Cistercians initially 
spread through Europe. The entire canal diffusion cycle from 1 
percent to 99 percent spans some sixty years. The year of maxi-
mum growth, or midpoint (tm), occurred in 1835. 
Subsequent major transport infrastructures, rails and roads, 
evolved along a dynamic pattern similar to canals, as Figure 4 
illustrates. 14 In the figure the sizes of individual networks have 
Figure 3. Growth of the Canal Network in Operation in the United 
States. 
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been normalized for better comparability; in absolute extension, 
railways and surfaced road networks were one and two orders of 
magnitude larger, respectively, than canals at their maximum net-
work length. Not surprisingly, the duration of the growth of 
railway and surfaced road networks is somewhat slower, t:.t's of 
fifty-five and sixty-four years, respectively. Interestingly, we see 
the three major historic transport infrastructures spaced rhythmi-
cally apart in their development by a half century or so. 
Transport infrastructures strongly influence nearly every aspect 
of daily life. 15 Here we will comment only on their close relation-
ship with other infrastructures. As Figure 4 suggests, the railway 
and the telegraph evolved together, as did the road network and 
the oil pipelines delivering the fuel for the cars on the roads. This 
synchronization illustrates technological interdependence and cross 
enhancement. Particular technologies and techniques do not dif-
fuse in isolation but in a larger context, as we shall discuss below. 
In fact, a new solution does not evolve in a vacuum but interacts 
with existing practices and technologies. One technology replaces 
or substitutes for another, with varying degrees of direct one-to-
one competition. For example, after reaching its maximum size, 
Figure 4. Growth of Infrastructures in the United States as a Percentage 
of their Maximum Network Size. 
90 
80 
70 
C' 60 
. 
~ 
~ 50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 
Year 
Source: Arnulf Griibler and Neboj5a Nakicenovic, "Long Waves, Technology Diffusion, 
and Subsrirurion," Review 14 (2) (Spring 1991): 313-342. 
28 Arnulf Grub/er 
the canal network declined rapidly because of vicious competition 
from railways. Looking at relative "market shares" of competing 
alternatives rather than at absolute volumes makes the interaction 
visible. 
Probably the most famous case of technological substitution is 
motor cars for horses. In this case, the diffusion of one technologi-
cal artifact, the passenger car, began simply by replacing another, 
the riding horse and the carriage. Looking at the absolute numbers 
of draft animals and cars in the United States (Figure 5), we see 
that the millions of horses and mules used for transport practically 
disappeared from the roads within fewer than three decades. Mea-
sured by a curve fit to a model of logistic substitution,16 the 
duration of the replacement process (M) was only twelve years, 
fast enough to traumatize the oat growers and the blacksmiths.17 
Interestingly, the diffusion of a modern anti-pollution device, the 
catalytic converter, also occurred with a M of twelve years in the 
Figure 5. Number of Non-Farm Draft Animals and Automobiles. 
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Figure 6. Diffusion of Cars with First Emission Controls and Catalytic 
Converters in the United States, in fractional shares of total car fleet. 
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United States (Figure 6). The reason is probably that the lifetime of 
the road vehicle has not changed since the horse-and-carriage era; 
the working lives of horses and cars both last about ten to twelve 
years. 
The continuing growth of the car population in Figure 5 illus-
trates another dynamic feature of technological evolution: growth 
beyond the initial substitution or field of application. Use of the 
car grew initially by replacing horses. After completion of that 
process in the 1930s, new markets were created. Higher average 
speeds, greater reliability in all weather conditions, and other 
features opened chances both for competition with trains for long-
distance travel and for short-distance commuting that created 
suburbs, which in turn created more demand for cars. Currently 
some 150 million passenger cars are registered in the United States, 
about 0.6 cars per capita. 
Mention of the sequence of horses, trains, and cars brings us to 
consider the most realistic process of technological change: mul-
tiple competing technologies. In steel manufacturing as many as 
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Figure 7. Process Technology Change in US Steel Manufacturing, in 
fractional shares of raw steel tonnage produced. 
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four technologies have competed simultaneously with decreasing 
and increasing market shares (Figure 7). The diffusion trajectories 
of the processes are diverse, with bi. t's ranging from less than two 
decades (replacement of the crucible process) to nearly seven de-
cades (diffusion of electric arc steel). These changes in process 
technology not only enabled significant expansion of production 
but mattered greatly from an environmental perspective. They 
coincided with changes in energy supplies toward higher quality 
and cleaner energy carriers, consistent with the overall evolution 
of energy supply. 18 Between 1800 and 1930 in the United States, 
one hundred million cords of hardwood are estimated to have 
been cut for charcoal for smelting iron. 19 
Let us now bring space back into our time picture. We have 
drawn examples so far from the United States. We commented at 
the outset about the patterns in space as well as the time of the 
diffusion of the Cistercian rule. Does the same hold true for a 
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modern technology such as the motor car? Like Burgundy and its 
Cistercians, the United States was the earliest adopter of the car 
and has achieved the highest density of cars. Having started to 
adopt cars rapidly about the year 1910, America now has almost 
six hundred cars per thousand people. Having started in 1930, the 
United Kingdom now parks about four hundred cars per thousand 
people, while Japan parks about three hundred per thousand, 
having started the adoption process only in the 1950s. As Figure 8 
suggests, empirical data from numerous countries show that later 
adopters manifest both an accelerated diffusion rate (shorter diffu-
sion time) and a declining density of adoption as a function of the 
introductory date. The case of cars is corroborated by analysis of 
the declining adoption densities of "late-starters" in the railway 
development of the nineteenth century.20 
The spread of railway networks in fact clearly shows how both 
spatial densities and the temporal rates of the adoption of tech-
nologies remain diverse. In the United States, the early innovation 
centers for railways on the East Coast and around the Great Lakes 
achieved by far the greatest spatial density of networks. Railway 
construction reached the West Coast some fifty years after the East 
Coast, and network densities remained significantly lower. In Eu-
rope, rails spread from the north of England in the 1820s to the 
rest of England and also to Belgium. By 1836 independent innova-
tion centers had arisen in the Lyons region of France and Austria-
Bohemia. The railway innovation wave spread from the early 
continental centers to cover most of Western and Central Europe 
by the 1850s. By the mid 1870s all of Eastern Europe, as well as 
most of European Russia, southern Scandinavia, and part of the 
Balkans, were networked. The final European subinnovation cen-
ter was Greece, toward 1900. Rails penetrated the Albanian re-
gion almost a century after England. Starting first, England built a 
network (with attendant costs and benefits) one-third denser than 
Germany, almost twice the density of France, and ten or more 
times denser than other countries that might have appeared com-
parable at the outset of the railroad era. 
In this light, we can ask, is the United States a likely guide for 
future mass-motorization globally? According to our understand-
ing, no. Instead, the high density of cars in the United States results 
from specific initial conditions, including high individual mobility 
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before the advent of the automobile and a long period of diffusion, 
which created precisely the conditions in life-style, spatial division 
of labor, and settlement patterns of an "automobile society." As 
Figure 8 indicates, heterogeneity in rates of diffusion and thus 
levels of adoption follows orders and thus is likely to persist, not 
only for railways and autos but in general for systems that diffuse 
globally. This perspective leads to lower-than-usual estimates of 
future demand for transport energy for China, for example.21 
Figure 8. Passenger Car Diffusion at the Global Level: Catch-Up, but 
at Lower Adoption Levels. 
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SEASONS OF SATURATION 
We have noted that clusters of radical innovations and technology 
systems, interdependent and mutually cross-enhancing, give rise to 
families of technological innovations with associated new institu-
tional and organizational settings. For example, the development 
of the automotive industry was contingent on developments in 
materials (high-quality steel sheets), the chemical industries (oil 
refining, in particular catalytic cracking), production and supply 
infrastructures (exploration and oil production, pipelines and gasoline 
stations), development of public infrastructures (roads), and a host 
of other technological innovations. The growth of the industry 
was based on a new production organization (Fordist mass pro-
duction combined with Taylorist scientific management principles), 
yielding significant real-term cost reductions that made the car 
affordable to more social strata, thus changing settlement pat-
terns, consumption habits of the population, and leisure activities. 
In turn, the automobile is just one artifact among many consumer 
durables now standard in every household in industrialized coun-
tries. These linkages multiply the effects of such techno-institu-
tional clusters on the economy and society and account for their 
pervasive impact. 
To quantify the emergence of technology clusters, I analyzed the 
history of a large sample of technologies for the United States.22 
Consistent with the definition of technology adopted here, the 
sample used in the analysis was not taken from the hard technol-
ogy field alone. The cases included diffusion of energy, transport, 
manufacturing, agriculture, consumer durables, communication, 
and military technologies, as well as diffusion of economic and 
social processes, such as literacy, reduction of infant mortality, 
and changes in job classes. Two samples were analyzed. The first 
consisted of 117 diffusion cases that my colleagues at the Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis and I had studied 
ourselves.23 The second sample was augmented by additional, well-
documented cases with a quantification of diffusion parameters 
that we found in the literature. This sample totaled 265 cases of 
innovation. 
The profile of the diffusion rates, or M's, was quite similar for 
the two samples. The rates ranged from very short-term processes 
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of only a few years to processes that extended over two to three 
centuries. The mean value ranged between forty and sixty years, 
with a standard deviation of about equal size (Figure 9). The 
largest number of diffusion processes in our samples have charac-
teristic durations, l:..t's, of between fifteen and thirty years.24 If our 
diffusion studies had documented more of the seemingly numerous 
short-term phenomena such as clothing fashions, the profile of the 
histogram in Figure 9 would likely approach a "rank-size" or Zipf 
distribution in which the frequency of diffusion rates would be 
highest for fast processes and decline as the rates became slower.25 
The good news for the human environment from our analysis is 
that the majority of artifacts and practices can be replaced within 
a few decades. However, some key processes have demonstrably 
long durations. For example, the global quests for improvements 
Figure 9. Histogram of Diffusion Rates of Samples of 117 and 265 
Processes of Technological, Economic, and Social Change in the United 
States. 
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in the thermodynamic efficiency of prime movers and for the 
decarbonization of the energy system both clock in at about three 
hundred years.26 In general, pervasive transformations take time. 
The transformation of the US population from a society of farmers 
to manufacturers to service workers took some two hundred years.27 
Societies starting the move from brown to blue and to white 
collars later may accordingly move faster, but such all-embracing 
processes will never collapse to weeks and months. 
We might summarize by saying that at any time, change in a 
society can be decomposed into a large number of diffusion (or 
substitution) processes with great variety in their rates. We can 
then ask whether aggregate measures exist for the average diffu-
sion rate over time for the whole socioeconomic system and whether 
it changes. For such a measure, I calculated the average diffusion 
rates of the innovation samples, that is, the sum of the first deriva-
tives of the diffusion (or substitution) trajectories at each point in 
time divided by the number of diffusion processes then occurring. 
This indicator is the diffusion equivalent of the annual GNP growth 
rate. The resulting measure rates the average annual technical (and 
economic and social) change at the country level.28 
For the United States since 1800, the calculated average diffu-
sion rate portrays clear peaks and troughs, which vary by a factor 
of two or more. The process of change is not gradual and linear 
but is instead characterized by long swings and discontinuities. In 
addition, rates of change tend to increase over time. This rise may 
reflect that the closer we approach the present, the more processes 
are included in the sample. However, the rising average rate of 
change could also result from the cumulative nature of technologi-
cal change. Even though no individual diffusion process may pro-
ceed faster when compared to the past, the number and variety of 
artifacts (particularly those with faster turnover rates) are in fact 
much larger today than earlier. This could increase the average 
rate of change. In other words, while no individual technology or 
artifact diffuses faster than it did in the past (other things being 
equal), many more technologies and objects are in use, and thus 
more change. In any case, the analyses show pronounced 
discontinuities and also a decline in the diffusion rate in the de-
cades after 1970, indicating an increase in saturation phenomena 
in the United States since then. 
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The fluctuations and discontinuities in the long-term rate of 
sociotechnical change result from the complex dynamics of the 
discontinuous rates at which individual innovations appear and 
from the different rates of absorption of these innovations in the 
socioeconomic system. Periods of accelerating rates appear to indi-
cate the emergence of a technology cluster in which a large number 
of interrelated innovations diffuse into the economic and social 
environment. These in turn contribute, by means of backward and 
forward linkages, to prolonged periods of economic growth. 
Periods in which progressively more and more innovations enter 
their saturation phase of diffusion follow the growth periods. 
Thus, each major peak in the average rate of change characterizes 
the start of saturation of a corresponding cluster or family of 
diffusion processes. This "season of saturations" results in a sig-
nificant decline in the average rate of technical and social change 
and, through market saturation and a decrease in investments, 
also contributes to a slowdown in economic growth. 
Presumably many inventions of the past few decades now await 
their chance to become successful innovations. Were they included, 
these could reverse the recent downward trend in the rate-of-
change curve by the late 1990s. Then the successful innovations, 
after a slow initial diffusion, would enter into the rapid, indeed 
exponentially growing part of their life cycle. 
The turning points in the rates of diffusion of technological and 
social innovations coincide with the turning points of so-called 
long-waves of economic growth as identified by several research-
ers.29 In the analysis of US data, the peaks-the maxima in the rate 
of sociotechnical change and the onset of leveling off and satura-
tion phenomena-occurred in 1840, 1912, and 1970, respectively. 
Troughs, maxima of saturation periods and the slow beginning of 
a new phase of accelerated sociotechnical change, occurred in 
1820, 1875, and 1930. Appropriately, these troughs correspond to 
periods of pronounced recession, even depression, in the economic 
development of the United States. 
From a historical perspective we can associate four technology 
clusters with this statistical pattern and speculate on the emer-
gence of a fifth. The clusters may be identified by their most 
important economic branches, infrastructures, or functioning prin-
ciples. Extending to the 1820s, we find textiles, turnpikes, and 
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water mills; extending until about 1870 we find steam, canals, and 
iron; extending until about 1940 we find coal, railways, steel, and 
industrial electrification; extending to the present we find oil, 
roads, plastics, and consumer electrification.3° Currently we ap-
pear to be in transition to a new era of industrial and economic 
development. We can speculate that it will be characterized by 
natural gas, aviation, "total quality control" of both the internal 
and external (or environmental) quality of industrial production, 
and the massive expansion of information handling. 
These observations add up to an essentially Schumpeterian view 
of long-term development. Major economic expansion periods 
appear driven by the widespread diffusion of a host of interrelated 
innovations-a technology cluster-leading to new products, mar-
kets, industries, and infrastructures. These diffusion processes are 
sustained by, in fact are contingent on, mediating social and orga-
nizational diffusion processes. The growth or diffusion of a domi-
nant cluster cannot be sustained indefinitely, however. 
Market saturation, the dwindling improvement of possibilities 
for existing process technologies, managerial and organizational 
settings, and an increasing awareness of the negative (specifically, 
environmental) externalities involved in the further extension of 
the dominant growth regime pave the way to a season of satura-
tions. During such periods, opportunities arise for the introduction 
of new technological, organizational, and social solutions, some of 
which may have been latent but were barred from market entry by 
the dominance of the previous growth paradigm. Even when such 
innovations are introduced successfully, their penetration rates in 
the initial phase of their diffusion life cycle are rather slow, and a 
matching new social and economic mediating context has still to 
emerge. In the phase-transition period, the old is saturating, and 
the new is still embryonic. Only after such a period of transition, 
crisis, and mismatch does a prolonged period of widespread diffu-
sion of a new sociotechnical "bandwagon" and thus of growth 
become possible. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical examination of diffusion processes, as illustrated in this 
essay, highlight the following observations: 
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1) No innovation spreads instantaneously. Instead, a typical S-
shaped temporal pattern seems to be the rule. This basic pattern 
appears invariant, although the regularity and timing of diffusion 
processes vary greatly. 
2) Diffusion is a spatial as well as temporal phenomenon. Origi-
nating from innovation centers, a particular idea, practice, or 
artifact spreads out to its hinterland by means of a hierarchy of 
subinnovation centers and into the periphery, defined spatially, 
functionally, or socially. 
3) The periphery, while starting adoption later, profits from 
learning and the experience gained in the core area and generally 
has faster adoption rates. As the development time is shorter, 
however, the absolute adoption intensity is lower than in innova-
tion centers or in core areas (spatial or functional) proximate to 
them. 
4) Although diffusion is essentially a process of imitation and 
homogenization, it clusters and lumps. The densities of application 
remain discontinuous in time and heterogeneous in space among 
the population of potential adopters and across different social 
strata. In fact, overall development trajectories appear necessarily 
punctuated by crises that emerge in transitional periods. As such, 
diffusion and its discontinuities may be among the inherent fea-
tures of the evolutionary process that governs social behavior. 
Nevertheless, appropriate incentives and policies may nurture 
the development of more benign technologies and their diffusion, 
and many changes can be implemented over a time frame of two 
to three decades. However, sectors and areas will also remain in 
which changes will occur much more slowly, particularly those 
related to the long-lived structures of our built environment: for 
example, infrastructures for transport and energy as well as hous-
ing stock. Here rates of change and diffusion constants ranging 
from several decades to a century are typical and will be costly to 
accelerate. Therefore, the efficiency with which existing systems 
are used merits attention. 
In essence we have two strategies in light of diffusion. One 
focuses on incremental changes, for example, environmental add-
on or "end-of-pipe" technologies. Such policies can bring quick 
changes but tend to reinforce the dominant trajectory, blocking 
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more systemic and radical changes. A second strategy opts for 
more radical departures from existing technologies and practices. 
However, these strategies, such as the development of fuel cells 
and hydrogen for energy, although more effective in the long run, 
require much more time to implement because of the multiplicity 
of forward and backward linkages between technologies, infra-
structures, and forms of organization for their production and use. 
The interdependence between individual artifacts and long-lived 
infrastructures creates our dilemma. Within two to three decades 
the United States could in principle change its entire fleet to zero-
emission vehicles. In fact, 99 percent of vehicles now on the road 
will be scrapped in this interval. Yet, this interval is too short for 
the diffusion of the required associated energy supply, transport, 
and delivery infrastructures, which will inevitably distend the rate 
of diffusion of end-use devices. Thus, key technologies that we can 
already envision to raise the quality of the environment probably 
must await the second half of the twenty-first century to become 
widespread and influential. 
Historically, technology clusters have been instrumental in rais-
ing productivity and also in alleviating many adverse environmen-
tal effects. The emergence of a new cluster could hold the promise 
of an environmentally more compatible technological trajectory. 
But it will take time. There are times of change and times for 
change, and unless our individual and collective behavior is modi-
fied, these times will remain to frustrate and excite us. 
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